Towards the Law of Legal Services

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INTRODUCTION

Imagine that someone asks you how legal services are regulated in the United States. You might answer that lawyers need a license in the jurisdictions where they intend to practice, typically after graduating from an ABA-accredited law school and passing the bar examination. You could explain that lawyers are governed by rules of professional conduct and subject to discipline, including disbarment, for failing to comply. You also might mention the growing patchwork of state and federal regulations that govern lawyers’ behavior. Each of these answers offers a slightly different perspective on the regulation of legal services, but they share one common feature: they are all about lawyers.

This Article contends that the current lawyer-based regulatory framework should be reimagined if we hope to spur more innovation and expand access to justice. Rather than focusing on the so-called “law of lawyering”—the body of rules and statutes regulating lawyers—this Article suggests that we need to develop a broader “law of legal services”

1 See generally Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs & Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Am. Bar Ass’n, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements (Erica Moeser & Claire Huismann eds. 2015), available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Comp-Guide/CompGuide.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/VU22-YJM2?type=pdf. Of course, there are some exceptions to the general rule. For example, some states permit lawyers to gain admission without attending an ABA accredited law school. Id. at 8-11. Moreover, many states allow experienced lawyers from other jurisdictions to gain admission by motion. Id. at 34. Additionally, Wisconsin has the so-called diploma privilege, which allows lawyers to gain admission to the bar merely by graduating from a law school in the state. See Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 40.03. New Hampshire has a more limited version of the diploma privilege. See N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 42(XII).
4 The term “access to justice” is often used in this context, see, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice (2004), but it may be more appropriate in some situations to say that the public needs better “access to legal services.” After all, many important legal and law-related services (e.g., getting a will or health care proxy) are not necessarily about “justice,” at least not in the usual sense of the word. That said, a significant percentage of legal services have a strong relationship to justice, so the phrase “access to justice” is appropriate in most circumstances. I use the terms interchangeably in this Article.
that authorizes, but appropriately regulates, the delivery of more legal and law-related assistance by people who do not have a J.D. degree and do not work alongside lawyers. For example, the Washington Supreme Court recently adopted a framework for allowing specially educated and separately regulated professionals—Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs)—to deliver a narrow range of family law services without a traditional law license.\(^6\) Some observers predict that LLLTs will be able to offer assistance at a lower cost than lawyers and improve access to legal services.\(^7\) This type of regulatory reform,\(^8\) which falls outside the law of lawyering, illustrates the growing importance and potential utility of the law of legal services.

The idea of looking beyond the law of lawyering for ways to encourage innovation is conceptually different from many recent calls for regulatory reforms, which focus on expanding opportunities for lawyers and people without a law degree to work together through alternative business structures (ABSs).\(^9\) To be sure, ABSs are a potentially important development, but they are necessarily a creature of the law of lawyering. Consider, for example, the authorization of ABSs under the United Kingdom’s Legal Services Act (LSA).\(^10\) Passed in 2007, the LSA requires ABSs to have a lawyer manager,\(^11\) provides detailed regulations about a

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\(^8\) For other useful examples, see Leslie C. Levin, *The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales About the Superiority of Lawyers*, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2615-16 (2014).


lawyer’s role in the ABS, and explains the role that people without a law degree can play relative to lawyers. The LSA does not purport to regulate other professionals who want to deliver legal services completely apart from the legal profession. In other words, reforms focused on ABSs overlook regulatory innovations outside the law of lawyering—like the LLLT program—that hold the promise of an even greater impact on legal services.

Part II explains the distinction between the law of lawyering and the law of legal services in more detail. I contend that most regulatory reform proposals are directed at the law of lawyering and that even seemingly radical proposals, such as those related to ABSs, are fundamentally lawyer-based regulations.

Part III describes the most recent law of lawyering reform effort in the United States—the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20. Drawing on my experience as the Commission’s Chief Reporter, I review the changes that resulted from the Commission’s work and argue that they illustrate the limited scope of the law of lawyering.

Part IV responds to common criticisms of the Commission—that it had an unduly narrow view of what was possible within the law of lawyering and that the Commission failed to achieve needed change. I argue that these criticisms are misplaced for two reasons. First, the Commission was created to examine how the law of lawyering should be updated in light of technological change and globalization, and the Commission largely achieved that goal. It addressed quite a few practical new ethics issues that lawyers regularly encounter.

Second, and more fundamentally, there was relatively little the Commission could have accomplished within the law of lawyering that would have had any meaningful effect on the delivery of legal services in the United States. The only possible exception would have been a liberalization of Model Rule 5.4, which currently prohibits ABSs. Any such proposal at that time, however, was facing near certain defeat in the ABA’s policymaking body, the House of Delegates. More importantly, and less intuitively, preliminary evidence suggests that ABSs by themselves may not catalyze the bold changes that some have predicted.

I conclude that we can more effectively advance the interests of justice by authorizing people without a law degree to participate in the legal


12 Legal Services Act, § 82, sch. 11.


15 See infra Part II.

16 See infra Part III.A.

17 See infra Part III.B.2.a.

18 See infra Part III.B.2b.
marketplace with some form of regulatory oversight. To do so, we need to focus on developing the law of legal services rather than fixating exclusively on the law of lawyering and issues like ABS.

Part IV offers some preliminary thoughts on the regulatory objectives that should inform the law of legal services, such as ensuring competence, facilitating consumer choice, requiring transparency, providing remedies for misconduct, ensuring professional independence, and fostering faith in the justice system and the rule of law. I then describe two types of regulatory innovations that would satisfy these regulatory objectives and achieve significant change. First, new market actors should be authorized to participate in a market that has historically excluded them. For instance, Washington State’s LLLT program is creating a new, and likely lower cost, option for consumers by allowing appropriately trained and regulated professionals to engage in some kinds of law practice without a law degree.19 Second, by explicitly authorizing but appropriately regulating existing service providers, such as those offering automated legal document assembly (e.g., LegalZoom), these providers will have less to fear from restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law and have a greater incentive to innovate and expand.20

For too long, regulatory reforms have focused primarily on the limited options available within the law of lawyering. By looking beyond that body of law, we can unlock the innovative potential of new providers who are capable of delivering legal services to those who need them. In this way, the law of legal services can safely expand the public’s options for addressing many legal needs, and it can do so in ways overlooked by conventional regulatory reform efforts.

I. Distinguishing the “Law of Lawyering” and the “Law of Legal Services”

A central contention in this Article is that the law of lawyering is inherently limited in scope and that regulatory innovations must emerge from what I call the law of legal services. The differences between these two concepts are not self-evident and require some explanation.

The law of lawyering, as its name suggests, concerns the law governing lawyers. It includes the rules of professional conduct as well as the growing number of laws, regulations, and rules (both state and federal) that govern lawyer behavior, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, related Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, IRS regulations, federal and state rules of civil procedure and evidence, and data privacy and security laws. In contrast, the law of legal services is much broader. It includes the law of lawyering as well as regulations governing the role that others might play in the delivery of legal services, or what one might call the law governing other legal services providers.

Historically, regulators and scholars have focused much of their attention on the law of lawyering. Consider, for example, the names of leading professional and academic centers in this area: the American Bar Association’s Center for Professional Responsibility, Harvard’s Center on the Legal Profession, Stanford’s Center on the Legal Profession, and Georgetown’s Center for the Study of the Legal Profession. A leading treatise has the title “The Law of Lawyering,” and there is a Restatement

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21 See Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 981-82 (cataloging various ways in which lawyers are now regulated).
24 Treas. Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. pt. 10; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 981-82.
26 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.010 et seq. (West 2014) (setting out requirements for the protection of personally identifiable information with no exceptions for law firms); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 et seq. (2015) (same).
27 See, e.g., HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 5.
of the “Law Governing Lawyers.”28 Many widely used casebooks have similar names and a similar orientation.29

The focus on the law of lawyering is not surprising. Until recently, the law governing other legal service providers has consisted primarily of unauthorized practice statutes and rules that have prohibited people who are not lawyers from playing any meaningful role in the delivery of legal services. As a result, the law in this area has traditionally received little attention beyond some important and longstanding efforts to liberalize unauthorized practice provisions (e.g., the work of Professor Deborah Rhode)30 and a few other ways in which people without a law degree have been permitted to deliver legal or law-related services.31

To be sure, the law of lawyering addresses some issues that involve the work of people who do not have a law license. For example, Model Rule 5.3 imposes on a lawyer the duty to supervise “nonlawyers”32 within the lawyer’s firm or to monitor nonlawyers outside the firm who work on client matters,33 and Model Rule 5.5 instructs lawyers that they are not permitted to facilitate the unauthorized practice of law.34 These provisions, however, do not directly regulate people who are not lawyers.

Even in jurisdictions that allow ABSs, the regulatory attention is on lawyers. For instance, Washington, D.C. permits alternative business structures, but the relevant rule focuses primarily on the lawyer’s role in supervising people who do not have a law license.35 When the rule addresses the responsibility of these “nonlawyers,” it merely instructs

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31 See, e.g., Chambliss, supra note 19, at 582 n.16; Stephen Gillers, How To Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 365, 414 (2013); Levin, supra note 8, at 2614.
32 The word “nonlawyer” is often and appropriately criticized because it suggests that the world is defined relative to lawyers. Alternative phrases, however, have their own problems. For example, it may be appropriate in some situations to refer to “other professionals,” but sometimes the word “nonlawyer” is used to refer to people who are not necessarily professionals in other fields. The phrase “people who are not lawyers” is also problematic, because it is both bulky and still defines the world relative to lawyers. Nevertheless, I avoid the word “nonlawyer” in this Article.
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013).
34 Id. R. 5.5.
them to “abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct.”

Similarly, and as explained earlier, the U.K.’s seminal LSA requires an ABS to have a lawyer manager, provides detailed regulations about a lawyer’s role in the entity, and explains the role that others can play relative to lawyers. The LSA, however, does not offer much guidance to people who want to deliver legal services without the involvement of lawyers. Although the LSA does leave significant market opportunities for lawyers by retaining a narrow set of “reserved” services that only lawyers are permitted to offer, the LSA does not provide any regulatory structure, guidance, or oversight regarding these non-reserved services. People who offer them are largely on their own from a regulatory perspective.

The Canadian Bar Association recently issued a Futures Report that reflects a similar lawyer-centric approach. The Report recommends ABSs and suggests a number of related regulatory innovations, but the Report expressly declines to address whether people without a law license should be permitted to deliver legal services in settings other than law firms or ABSs. The Report concludes that “[i]t is outside the scope of Futures’ work to determine whether some legal activities should no longer be reserved [for lawyers] or what further role might be played by other regulated professionals.”

Australia has permitted ABSs for more than a decade. It even allows publicly traded legal practices, making it one of the most liberal regimes in the world in this regard. But again, the regulatory structure for these arrangements is focused on either regulating lawyers or the role that people without a law license can play relative to lawyers.

All of these liberalizations are not unimportant, but they are fundamentally law of lawyering reforms. As the discussion below

36 Id. R. 5.4(b)(2).
37 See supra note 10-12.
41 Id. at 19.
42 Steve Mark, Views from an Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45, 47-50.
suggests, the law of lawyering is necessarily limited in terms of its potential to bring about significant change. A different conceptual focus may help to drive even more fundamental innovations in the delivery of, and the public’s access to, legal and law-related services.

II. THE LIMITS OF THE LAW OF LAWYERING: THE ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20 IN HINDSIGHT

The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 undertook the most recent law of lawyering reform effort in the U.S. Created in 2009 by then-ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm, the Commission was tasked with studying how the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct should be updated to address increasing globalization and changes in technology. The Commission completed its work in February 2013, after successfully proposing numerous amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, developing a new model court rule and amending another.

44 See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm Creates Ethics Commission To Address Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/abanet/media/release/news_release.cfm?releaseid=730, archived at http://perma.cc/V537-6BSH. “The ethics commission will review lawyer ethics rules and regulation across the United States in the context of a global legal services marketplace.” Id. To ensure a diversity of perspectives, President Lamm appointed commissioners from the judiciary, large law firms, small law firms, in-house legal departments, and academia. See id.; see also ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: About Us, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/about_us.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R93H-WBCM (listing Commission members). The Commission was co-chaired by Jamie Gorelick, a partner at WilmerHale and former deputy attorney general under President Clinton, and Michael Traynor, former President of the American Law Institute. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: About Us, supra. The Commission had several law professor “reporters” who advised the Commission on the law of lawyering. Paul Paton served as the reporter for the Alternative Business Structures working group, and Anthony Sebok and Bradley Wendel served as the reporters for the Alternative Litigation Finance working group. They helped to draft the Commission’s work product (including proposals, white papers, and explanatory memoranda), and guided substantive deliberations during working group discussions and Commission meetings. The Commission was aided by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, particularly Ellyn Rosen, who served as the Commission’s lead counsel and helped the Commission navigate the ABA’s political structure. In my view, one fair criticism of the Commission and related legal ethics reform efforts is that they have failed to include people who are not lawyers. See Gillers, supra note 31, at 410; Moliterno, supra note 14, at 152.

releasing a white paper on alternative litigation financing,\textsuperscript{47} submitting an informational report on lawyer rankings,\textsuperscript{48} and referring several discrete topics to other ABA entities.\textsuperscript{49}

As described below, the Commission accomplished the narrow objective it was given: updating the law of lawyering to give lawyers the guidance they need to address 21\textsuperscript{st} century legal ethics issues. It did so by focusing on four important developments in the practice of law: (1) the increased use of technology in the delivery of legal services; (2) the advent of Internet-based client development tools; (3) the frequent disaggregation of law and law-related legal services through outsourcing; and (4) greater demand for lawyer mobility.\textsuperscript{50}

To be clear, the Commission’s work was not transformative, but that is exactly the point. The law of lawyering is primarily concerned with ethics issues arising for lawyers in their everyday practices. As explained in more detail in Part III.B, it does not offer many options for transforming the delivery of legal services.

A. Technology and the Delivery of Legal Services

The Commission’s work produced several changes to the Model Rules that address issues arising out of technology’s transformation of the


\textsuperscript{49} See infra Part II.E.

\textsuperscript{50} The Commission’s reports reveal far more detail about the nature of (and reasons for) the changes than what appears below. Those reports can be found at ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20: House of Delegates Filings, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20/house_of_delegates_filings.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MT4G-7Y42.
delivery of legal services, including the duty of confidentiality, technological competence, and the inadvertent disclosure of information.51

1. The Duty of Confidentiality in a Digital Age

The Commission found that data security is playing an increasingly important role in modern law practice. In the past, lawyers could easily protect a client’s confidential information by placing it in a locked file cabinet behind a locked office door. But today, lawyers store a range of information in the “cloud” (both private and public) as well as on the “ground,” using smart phones, laptops, tablets, and flash drives.52 This information is easily lost or stolen; it can be accessed without authority (e.g., through hacking); it can be inadvertently sent; and it can be intercepted while in transit.53

To address these issues, the Commission proposed—and the ABA’s 560 member policymaking body, the House of Delegates, adopted—Model Rule 1.6(c).54 The Model Rule now requires lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”55 New comment language identifies a number of factors lawyers should consider when determining whether their efforts have been “reasonable,” including but not limited to “the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).”56

2. Technological Competence

Prior to the Commission’s work, the Model Rules had not made any

54 ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105A rev., at 4; see also Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2013).
56 Id. cmts. 18-19. The Commission decided not to propose more detailed guidance, concluding that many specific recommendations, such as how to safeguard information stored on a mobile device, are likely to be outdated within a few years.
explicit reference to the word “technology.” The Commission concluded that today’s lawyers need to remain apprised of relevant technology, including the benefits and risks from its use. An amendment to what is now Comment [8] to Model Rule 1.1 captures this new reality (underlined language is new):

To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.

The Commission did not try to define technological competence, recognizing that a lawyer’s skillset necessarily needs to evolve along with technology itself. But the change has underscored the evolving nature of a lawyer’s ethical duty of competence and has proven to be among the most discussed pieces of the Commission’s work.

3. The Increased Frequency of Inadvertent Disclosures

In the past, the inadvertent disclosure of confidential information was relatively rare, but digital communications and the rise of electronic discovery have made this issue considerably more common. To address this concern, Model Rule 4.4 was amended in 2002 to instruct lawyers that they should notify senders of inadvertently disclosed information about their mistakes.

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57 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2011).
59 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013) (emphasis added); see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105A rev., at 3; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
60 See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013) (explaining various ways in which legal education will need to evolve to respond to the 21st century legal marketplace).
61 A search for “rule 1.1” /s competence /s technology and da(aft 08/01/2012 and bef 08/01/2014)” in Westlaw’s Journals and Law Reviews database yields more than 40 references to the new provision within the two years since it was adopted.
63 See id.
In light of the rapidly changing nature of the problem, the Commission concluded that the Model Rule and its accompanying comments could be usefully updated. For example, the Model Rule had previously described a lawyer’s duties when receiving inadvertently disclosed “documents,” a word that offered limited guidance when the disclosure involved electronic information. The Model Rule was amended to clarify that “electronically stored information,” not just information in tangible form, can trigger Model Rule 4.4(b)’s notification requirements. Moreover, the phrase “inadvertently sent” is now defined to give lawyers more guidance as to its meaning. And new comment language addressed the particular problem of metadata, noting that the receipt of metadata—embedded electronic data that is not visible on the face of a file or document—triggers the Model Rule’s notification duties, but only if the receiving lawyer knows or has reason to believe that the metadata was inadvertently sent.

4. Odd and Ends

The Commission’s work produced several other minor amendments that responded to changes in law practice technology. Amendments to Comment [9] of Model Rule 1.0 (Terminology) now make explicit that conflicts screens should prevent the sharing of both tangible and electronic information. The definition of a “writing” in paragraph (n) of Model Rule 1.0 (Terminology) was updated to replace the word “e-mail” with the broader phrase “electronic information,” ensuring that the definition captures the different ways a “writing” can occur. Finally, the last sentence of Comment [4] to Model Rule 1.4, which had said that, “[c]lient telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged,” was replaced with an admonition that more accurately reflects the increasingly varied ways in which lawyers and clients communicate: “A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications.”

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66 See id. at 6.
69 See id.
70 See id. R. 1.0 cmt. 9; see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105A rev., at 2-3; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
71 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(n); see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105A rev., at 1-3; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
73 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.4 cmt. 4 (2013); see also ABA Comm’n on
In sum, these amendments address technology-driven changes to the practice of law and offer lawyers needed guidance on issues they commonly encounter. Put another way, the amendments reflect the relatively limited potential of the law of lawyering to change how legal services are delivered.

B. Technology and Client Development

The law of lawyering’s banality is similarly illustrated by the Commission’s work on ethics issues arising from new client development tools. The Commission found that a growing number of lawyers now use online marketing methods, including law firm websites, blogs, social and professional networking sites, pay-per-click ads, and lead generation services. Although these tools are new and evolving, the Commission concluded that basic “principles underlying the existing Rules—preventing false and misleading advertising, protecting the public from the undue influence of solicitations, and safeguarding the confidences of prospective clients—remain valid.” For this reason, the Commission’s proposals focused on explaining how the Model Rules should apply to new settings rather than developing an entirely new regulatory structure. The proposals addressed several common practical problems.

1. Prospective Clients in a Digital Age

Model Rule 1.18 recognizes that lawyers have ethical duties not just to clients, but to “prospective clients” as well. For example, when someone shares confidential information with a lawyer in the lawyer’s office about a possible legal matter and the lawyer refuses the case, the lawyer still owes the person—the “prospective client”—a number of ethical duties, including the duty of confidentiality and a modified duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The problem is that people now interact with lawyers in new ways, such as through websites, social media, and online lead generation tools, making it difficult to determine when someone becomes a “prospective client.” The Commission concluded that the definition of a “prospective client” should reflect how lawyers and the public interact, so Model Rule 1.18(a) and the accompanying comments


75 COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 2012, supra note 45, at 9.

76 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b)-(d).

77 See id.

78 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT: RES 105B, supra note 74, at 2-3.
were amended to make clearer when a lawyer’s interactions with the public, including online interactions, give rise to a prospective client relationship.\footnote{See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.18 (2013); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105B, at 1-2 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105b.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3KCY-9L9S; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.}

2. Paying for “Recommendations”

Model Rule 7.2(b) prohibits a lawyer from giving someone anything of value (e.g., money) for recommending the lawyer’s services, but it allows lawyers to pay for advertisements.\footnote{See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(b).} Until recently, lawyers had relatively little trouble distinguishing between these two kinds of payments.\footnote{Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Report: Res 105B, supra note 74, at 3-4.} The Internet, however, has blurred these traditional lines, so the definition of the word “recommendation” was updated to reflect modern forms of marketing.\footnote{See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2 cmt. 5; ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105B, at 4-5; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.} Moreover, additional guidance was offered to help guide the growing industry of lead generation services (and the lawyers who use those services) to ensure reasonable consumer protections without unnecessarily impeding this new method for matching clients and lawyers.\footnote{Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3 & cmts. 7, 9; ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105B, at 6-8; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12; see also Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Report: Res 105B, supra note 74, at 3-7. There was some discussion about liberalizing Rule 7.2 and lifting all restrictions on paying for recommendations. See Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Report: Res 105B, supra note 74, at 6. It was ultimately rejected, but even if adopted, the change would have had a relatively limited impact on the delivery of legal services. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3.}

3. Defining Solicitations in the Internet Era

Model Rule 7.3(a) prohibits most kinds of in-person solicitations, but the Model Rule permits (yet regulates) less intrusive forms of solicitations, such as those sent by direct mail and email.\footnote{See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (2013); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105B, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105b.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3KCY-9L9S; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12; see also Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Report: Res 105B, supra note 74, at 7-8.} This distinction used to be reasonably clear, but new forms of marketing once again have blurred the traditional lines. The Commission sought to address some of these ambiguities by creating a new definition of a “solicitation.”\footnote{See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.3.}
giving lawyers the guidance they need to use new forms of client development. But again, the law of lawyering in this area offers few, if any, ways to transform the delivery of legal services.

C. The Disaggregation of Law and Law-Related Work (Outsourcing)

The Commission found that lawyers are “increasingly outsourcing legal and law-related work, both domestically and offshore” and that these practices should be permissible as long as lawyers follow certain guidelines.86 With regard to the outsourcing of work to other lawyers, the comments to Model Rule 1.1 (Competence) were amended to identify the considerations lawyers should consider, such as the competence of the lawyers in the other firm.87 With regard to work outsourced to people without a law license, the title and comments to Model Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance) were amended to emphasize that lawyers should make reasonable efforts to ensure that outsourced work is performed in a manner compatible with the lawyer’s own professional obligations, including the lawyer’s obligation to protect client information.88

To be sure, outsourcing does have the potential to shape how legal services are delivered, at least to some degree. For example, legal services would probably be more expensive in certain contexts if outsourcing were unavailable. That said, the changes in this area largely codified existing practices and are unlikely to have much of an effect on the delivery of legal services.89

88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 & cmts. 3-4; ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Res. No. 105C, at 2-3; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
D. The Globalization of Legal Services

Lawyers traditionally practiced in a single jurisdiction for their entire careers and had little need to relocate. Times have changed. Globalization and technology have transformed the legal marketplace and fueled considerably more cross-border practice and lawyer mobility. The Commission’s resolutions addressed some of these issues by creating a more permissive model for cross-border practice and mobility for both domestic and foreign lawyers.

1. Liberalizing the Model Rule on Admission by Motion

The ABA Model Rule on Admission by Motion, which was adopted in 2002, allows licensed lawyers to gain admission to a new jurisdiction without having to sit for another bar examination. The Commission concluded that the Model Rule should be liberalized to allow lawyers to become eligible for this admission procedure after fewer years in practice (three years instead of five). The ABA House of Delegates agreed and adopted the recommendation. The Commission also successfully proposed a resolution that urged “jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Rule on Admission by Motion to do so, and urge[d] jurisdictions that have adopted admission by motion procedures to eliminate any restrictions that do not appear in the Model Rule on Admission by Motion.”

2. The Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission

The Commission found that lawyers increasingly need to relocate to a new jurisdiction and start practicing there on shorter notice than an admission by motion procedure allows and that a temporary and more immediate practice authority would provide a useful bridge. The new

90 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 2012, supra note 45, at 6-7.
91 See id.
93 See id.
94 See MODEL RULES ON ADMISSION BY MOTION R. 1(c) (2012); Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.
Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission was adopted to enable lawyers who have been engaged in the active practice of law for three of the last five years to practice from an office in a new jurisdiction while pursuing admission through an authorized procedure, such as admission by motion or passage of that jurisdiction’s bar examination.97

3. Greater Mobility for Foreign Lawyers

In a globalized world where a growing number of legal matters implicate the law of other countries, the Commission found that clients often need the expertise of lawyers licensed abroad.98 The Commission’s work has made it easier for lawyers licensed in foreign jurisdictions to practice in the U.S. In particular, the Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission was amended to permit judges, at their discretion and subject to numerous limitations, to authorize foreign lawyers to appear pro hac vice in U.S. courts.99 Amendments to Model Rule 5.5(d) authorize foreign lawyers to serve as in-house counsel from within the U.S.,100 and corresponding amendments to the Model Rule for Registration of In-House Counsel provide a mechanism to identify, monitor, and hold these lawyers accountable.101


The increasing globalization of law practice has made it difficult for lawyers in certain contexts to be able to determine which jurisdiction’s ethics rules apply when determining whether a conflict of interest

97 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT: RES. 105D, supra note 96, at 2; Memorandum, 2012 Annual Meeting, supra note 46, at 12.

98 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 45, at 3.


exists. This problem is particularly pronounced for law firms with offices abroad, where the rules on conflicts are considerably different from those found in the U.S. To address this issue, new language was added to Comment [5] of Model Rule 8.5 (Choice of Law) to expressly authorize lawyers and clients, subject to numerous restrictions, to specify which jurisdiction’s conflict rules will apply to the relationship.

5. Conflicts Checking When Moving Firms

Greater lateral movement among law firms and increased merger activity among firms have made it necessary for lawyers to disclose some types of confidential information to lawyers in other law firms in order to identify potential conflicts of interest. The Commission found that the Model Rules did not explain how these necessary disclosures could occur in a manner that was consistent with the duty of confidentiality. To address this problem, Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) was amended to clarify that lawyers have the authority to disclose discrete categories of information to other firms to ensure that conflicts of interest are detected before lawyers are hired or firms merge. At the same time, the amendments make clear that such disclosures are impermissible if they would “compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.” Comment language was revised to provide even more detailed guidance.

E. Other Work Product and Referred Issues

In addition to recommending changes to the Model Rules, the Commission produced reports on lawyer rankings and alternative litigation
finance. The Commission also referred specific topics to ABA entities with the necessary expertise to address them. For example, the Commission asked the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility to develop ethics opinions on several topics, including two choice of law issues associated with ABSs (one of which led to an important ethics opinion) as well as various issues arising from virtual law practice and other topics related to the increasing importance of technology in practice today.

III. RESPONDING TO CRITICS OF THE COMMISSION

Some commentators have criticized the modest scope of the Commission’s work, claiming that the Commission should have done more to achieve needed reforms within the law of lawyering. I believe that these criticisms are misplaced for two reasons. First, as the preceding discussion suggests, the Commission fulfilled its charge by generating needed guidance on a number of important everyday practice and ethics issues. Second, and more importantly, the critics overestimate the extent to which the law of lawyering can produce meaningful reform. The reality is that bold changes like ABS may actually be less significant than proponents believe, and truly meaningful changes need to take place entirely outside of the law of lawyering.

A. The Commission Offered Needed Guidance

One commentator has provocatively suggested that the changes resulting from the Commission’s work were so inconsequential that “casebook and treatise writers can make the Ethics 20/20 induced changes to their next editions in thirty minutes or less.”

This criticism contains more rhetoric than reality. As Part II describes, the Commission has helped lawyers navigate the increasingly

112 See Memorandum from Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor to Paula Frederick, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 – Ethics Opinion Referrals (September 6, 2011) (on file with author); Memorandum from Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor to Paula Frederick, The Commission’s Proposal Concerning ABA Formal Opinion 91-360 (November 22, 2011) (on file with author).
113 See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal & Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, “One, No One and One Hundred Thousand” . . . Which Ethical Rule to Apply? Conflict of Ethical Rules in International Arbitration, 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 283, 283 (2013) (criticizing Commission for failing to develop rules to address conflicting rules in international arbitrations); John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 55, 71, 91 (2013) (suggesting that many scholars believed the Commission did not produce needed changes and “that the final work product of Ethics 20/20 was a major disappointment to those who believed that the Model Rules needed significant revision in light of the changes in the legal profession”); Moliterno, supra note 14; at 153-60.
114 Moliterno, supra note 14, at 160.
common ethical issues associated with legal process outsourcing, Internet-based advertising, confidentiality obligations when changing employment, the receipt of inadvertently sent information, and cybersecurity, among many other issues. The Commission also enabled more lawyer mobility by liberalizing the Model Rule on Admission by Motion, creating a new Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission, and facilitating clients’ use of foreign lawyers. These changes have not produced a fundamental structural shift in the law of lawyering, but they do address important practical issues that lawyers regularly encounter in the 21st century.

Another reading of the criticism is that, even if the issues the Commission addressed are useful, the Commission’s work merely reflected housekeeping or codifications of existing law. The reality, however, is that some of the changes broke new ground. For example, the new Rule 1.6(c) regarding a lawyer’s duty to protect confidential information is new, as are the Comments relating to the definition of a solicitation, the definition of a “recommendation” in Rule 7.2, the emphasis on technological competence, and the use of choice of rule agreements.

Other changes produced guidance that had been available only in non-binding (and, in the case of ABA Formal Opinions, non-public) ethics opinions. These changes included the amendments to Rule 1.6 authorizing the disclosure of confidential information to identify conflicts of interest, the guidance on outsourcing, and the definition of a prospective client. The elevation of this preexisting guidance to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct will give lawyers clearer, more reliable, and more accessible guidance than previously existed.

Still other changes reflect regulatory approaches that had existed in only a small number of states. The new Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission, the liberalized Model Rule on Admission by Motion, and the rules relating to foreign lawyers all fit this description.

115 See supra Part II.D.
116 Moliterno, supra note 14, at 153-54.
117 See supra Part II.A.1.
118 See supra Part II.B.3.
119 See supra Part II.B.2.
120 See supra II.A.2.
121 See supra Part II.D.4.
122 These opinions are publicly available for a period of time after they are released, but they are then placed behind a paywall.
124 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008); supra Part II.C.
126 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 2013, supra note 45, at 5-7 (documenting U.S. jurisdictions with already-liberalized rules allowing foreign lawyers greater authority to practice in U.S.); COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT: RES. 105D, supra note 96, at 2-3; (identifying several jurisdictions that have adopted approaches similar to the Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission); COMM’N ON
The helpfulness of these changes is illustrated by their relatively rapid adoption around the country. Only two years after the Commission completed its work, more than a dozen jurisdictions had adopted a significant portion of the changes. The vast majority of states differ from the Model Rules in important respects, so states often ignore changes to the Model Rules in whole or in part. The adoptions to date suggest that a large number of states find the changes to be more useful than critics have suggested.

Finally, the Commission’s work has proven to be helpful even when it did not produce any doctrinal changes. For example, the Commission’s report on the ethics of alternative litigation finance has been a valuable resource for lawyers, clients, and litigation funders on how to identify and avoid the various ethics-related issues arising in this context. The Commission’s work on ABSs could serve as a blueprint for future efforts in this area, either within the ABA or at the state level. And referrals to other ABA entities have led to useful outcomes, such as a recently issued Formal Opinion that addresses a choice of law problem relating to ABSs. In sum, the claim that the Commission’s work was inconsequential understates the Commission’s accomplishments or fails to appreciate the breadth of new issues that lawyers now face.

B. The “Law of Lawyering” Offers Few Bold Reform Options

A related, and more important, criticism is that the Commission should have sought “bolder” structural changes. Critics, however, typically cite only two “bold” changes the Commission should have pursued within the law of lawyering: further liberalizing the rules on multijurisdictional practice and easing restrictions on the rules prohibiting ABSs. As explained below, the Commission actually helped to

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ETHICS 20/20, REPORT: RES. 105E, supra note 92, at 1 n.5 (noting the widespread adoption of the Model Rule on Admission by Motion).


129 See COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE, supra note 47.


132 See supra note 113.

133 See, e.g., Moliterno, supra note 14, at 155. To be sure, some have argued that the
liberalize the multijurisdictional practice rules, and additional changes
would have had relatively little practical effect on the delivery of legal
services.\footnote{See infra Part III.B.1.} With regard to ABSs, any proposals in this area were unlikely
to be adopted by the House of Delegates at that time, and even less
intuitively, such a change may not have been as transformative as
proponents claim.\footnote{See infra Part III.B.2.b.}

1. Multijurisdictional Practice as Marginalia

The Commission moved the ball forward in this area in several
important respects. First, the Model Rule on Admission by Motion was
liberalized to allow lawyers to relocate to another jurisdiction without
taking the bar examination after three years of practice (instead of five).\footnote{See supra Part II.D.1}
Second, a resolution was adopted encouraging states to drop restrictions
on admission by motion that do not appear in the Model Rule and that
unnecessarily hinder mobility (e.g., reciprocity requirements that restrict
admission by motion to lawyers who are coming from jurisdictions that
offer admission by motion on a reciprocal basis).\footnote{See id.}
Third, foreign lawyers were given clearer and expanded practice authority when they
come to the United States to serve clients.\footnote{See supra Part II.D.3.}
And finally, a new Model Rule on Practice Pending Admission was created to authorize lawyers to
practice immediately upon arriving in a new jurisdiction, thus helping
lawyers who have to relocate with little advance notice.\footnote{See supra Part II.D.2.}

To be sure, multijurisdictional practice authority could be usefully
expanded and clarified in the future, such as by making it even easier for
lawyers to practice temporarily in jurisdictions where they are not
licensed. For example, the Model Rules might be amended to offer the
clarity and simplicity of states like Colorado, where lawyers from other
U.S. jurisdictions are permitted to practice on a temporary basis with very
few limitations.\footnote{See COLO. R. CIV. P. 204, 205; COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO
significantly in 2002 by the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional

Commission should have sought other kinds of reforms, such as the development of rules
for international arbitrations, Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, supra note 113, at 283, or
greater clarity regarding the mens rea requirements in the Model Rules, Dzienkowski,
supra note 113, at 95 (citing Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer
Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010)), but these kinds of changes
would not have had any significant effect on the delivery of legal services.
and the practice authority given to lawyers in states like Colorado is not much more expansive than the Model Rules already provide as a practical matter. Thus, there is little reason to believe that any additional temporary practice authority in the Model Rules will have any significant effect on the delivery of legal services or the structure of the profession. Put simply, additional changes in this area would not have produced any “bold” changes in the practice of law or the delivery of legal services.

2. ABSs (“Nonlawyer Ownership”) as a Nonstarter

A change to the Model Rule prohibiting alternative business structures would certainly have been perceived as bold, but criticisms of the Commission in this area are overstated for two reasons. First, as explained below, such a proposal faced near certain defeat in the ABA House of Delegates, at least at that time. More importantly, and less intuitively, there are reasons to question whether ABSs will bring about the “bold” changes the public really needs.

a. Any Proposal to Allow ABSs Would Likely Have Failed

History offers a useful guide to why the ABA House of Delegates was highly likely to reject any changes proposed by the Commission in this area. Since the Model Rules were adopted more than thirty years ago, the House of Delegates has repeatedly indicated its strong opposition to the idea of ABSs.

The Kutak Commission was responsible for drafting the Model Rules in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and its initial proposed draft of Model Rule 5.4 allowed for the creation of an ABS. The ABA House of Delegates rejected the idea for a variety of reasons, but concerns about competitive threats to the profession loomed large. For example, during

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142 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(c) (2013). Model Rule 5.5(c) provides fairly expansive authority to practice temporarily in a jurisdiction where a lawyer is not licensed. See id. Although it contains more ambiguities than the Colorado Rule, particularly in Model Rule 5.5(c)(4), there is no evidence that significant innovations in the delivery of legal services are adversely affected because of the rules in this area.
the House debate, a member asked whether the proposal would have allowed Sears Roebuck to open a law office in each of its stores. The Commissions’ reporter—Professor Geoffrey Hazard—answered “yes,” and the proposal was promptly defeated. Contemporaneous accounts suggest that the House’s vote was strongly motivated by concerns about competition from “nonlawyers”—the so-called “fear of Sears.”

More recently, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice ("MDP Commission") faced similar resistance. Created in 1998, the MDP Commission conducted numerous hearings, studied the issues, and concluded that lawyers and other professionals should be permitted to share fees as part of a multidisciplinary practice—a practice that delivers both legal and non-legal services. The Commission’s recommendation contained numerous restrictions, including careful regulations of MDPs that were designed to ensure client protection. Nevertheless, in August 1999, by a vote of 304 to 98, the ABA House of Delegates effectively rejected the idea, concluding that it should not be pursued again “until additional study demonstrates that such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession’s tradition of loyalty to clients.”

The MDP Commission responded by trying to conduct the requested “additional study” and released a revised recommendation and report the following year. The House again rejected the recommendation by a three to one margin and adopted a resolution saying that MDPs were

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145 See id.
147 Id. Today, the fear would undoubtedly be of Walmart. Indeed, in Canada, lawyers have stalls at an increasing number of stores. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Is Wal-Mart Law Coming to the US? Retailer Adds Lawyers on Site for Toronto-Area Shoppers, A.B.A. J. (May 8, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_walmart_law_coming_to_the_us_retailer_adds_lawyers_on_site_for_canadian_, archived at http://perma.cc/QJ37-W2A4. Similarly, Sam’s Club has struck a deal with LegalZoom to offer Sam’s Club members a special discount. See Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Products Will Be Sold at a Discount Through Sam’s Club, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_products_will_be_sold_at_a_discount_through_sams_club/, archived at http://perma.cc/2KWR-QT3J. What is notable about these developments is that the rules on ABSs are not an impediment. Lawyers in Canada are not controlled by Walmart, and LegalZoom is not a law firm. Thus, despite all of the concern about changes to Model Rule 5.4, legal services are creeping into chain stores through the backdoor (or the front sliding door).
150 See id. at 2-13.
151 Id. at 2-4.
152 See id. at 2-5.
inconsistent with the profession’s “core values.” Signaling that it did not want to revisit the issue, the House concluded flatly that “[t]he law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly transferring to nonlawyers ownership or control over entities practicing law, should not be revised.” The House also passed a separate resolution that “discharged” the MDP Commission, preventing the MDP Commission from bringing any additional work to the House for its consideration.

The Ethics 20/20 Commission came to the topic of ABSs with this history firmly in mind. Early in its work, the Commission decided not to propose multidisciplinary practices—lawyers and other professionals working together to deliver both legal and nonlegal services within a single practice—and instead developed a discussion draft containing a much more modest possible framework. This framework would have allowed someone who did not have a law license to have an ownership interest in a law firm, but only if that person assisted the law firm in providing legal services to its clients and the law firm’s “sole purpose” was to provide legal services. For example, accountants could become partners in a law firm and share in the legal fees the firm generated, but the accountants could not have their own separate accounting practices within the law firm. They only would be permitted to assist the firm’s lawyers in the delivery of legal services, thus reducing the risk that a practice area other than law might unduly influence the professional independence of lawyers. In this way, the discussion draft avoided the “Sears” scenario by prohibiting a single entity from offering legal and nonlegal services.

The discussion draft contained numerous other restrictions as well, such as caps on the percentage of ownership that other professionals could have and making lawyers responsible for ensuring that the other professionals’ behavior was consistent with the rules of professional conduct. In essence, this structure would have been more restrictive than the approach the District of Columbia has taken for more than 20 years. It also would have been much more modest than the proposals put forward by the MDP Commission or the Kutak Commission before it. Despite the incremental nature of the discussion draft, it prompted a markedly negative reaction. The Commission received 29 comments in

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153 See id. at 2-5 to 2-6.
154 Id. at 2-6.
155 See id. at 2-7.
156 See Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor to ABA Entities et al., supra note 130. Even the name of the document—a discussion draft—reflected the contentious nature of the issue. Other draft proposals were released as “draft resolutions,” but the controversy surrounding ABS was so intense that the Commission decided to call its initial draft a “discussion draft” to minimize the implication that it might become an actual proposal.
157 See id. at 2.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Alternative Law Practice Structures Comments Chart, A.B.A.,
response to the discussion draft, and only 6 of those comments supported changes in this area.161 Opposition came from important constituencies, including state bar associations,162 and they began mounting a significant political effort to oppose any changes in this area.163 The voices in support of change could best be characterized as lukewarm.164

At the same time, the Commission could not uncover empirical support for the idea that ABSs would benefit the public.165 There is considerable academic speculation that changes in this area will have a


161 See id.


164 The experience brings to mind Niccolo Machiavelli’s famous quote: “[t]here is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries . . . and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.” NICCOLÒ MACHIABELLI, THE PRINCE 22 (Luigi Ricci trans., Grant Richards 1903).

beneficial effect, but hard data to support this conclusion did not exist, either in the District of Columbia or countries that currently allow ABSs. As a result, the Commission would have found it difficult to satisfy the House’s request from a decade earlier to “demonstrate[] that such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession’s tradition of loyalty to clients.” The Commission ultimately cited this paucity of evidence as one of the primary reasons it decided to drop further efforts to amend Model Rule 5.4, explaining that it had “considered the pros and cons . . . and concluded that the case had not been made for proceeding even with a form of nonlawyer ownership that is more limited than the D.C. model.”

Notably, any proposal would have met with considerable resistance even if the Commission had been able to produce evidence that a change would benefit the public without attendant harms. Indeed, the Commission learned that some members of the House of Delegates were opposed to change as a matter of principle.

The opposition was so intense that it continued even after the Commission announced that it would not propose any changes in this area. The opposition centered on the Commission’s ongoing study of two discrete choice of law issues relating to ABSs. The first issue, which the Commission called the “inter-firm fee division” issue, was whether a lawyer in a jurisdiction that prohibited ABSs could divide a fee with a different law firm that happened to be structured as an ABS and located in a jurisdiction where such ABSs were permissible. The Commission developed a possible proposal to amend a Comment to Model Rule 1.5 to say that such fee divisions are permissible.

The second issue, which the Commission called the “intra-firm fee

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166 See, e.g., Knake, supra note 9, at 45 (observing that “[p]roponents of corporate law practice ownership and investment maintain that this will bring affordable representation to the general population and address the well-documented, unmet need for lawyers”).

167 See infra Part III.B.2.b (explaining that data is now starting to emerge, but does not support the conclusion that ABS by itself is the key to significant innovation).


170 Id.


172 See id. at 2-3.

173 See id.
sharing” issue,174 concerned the problem of a law firm with multiple offices, at least one of which was located in a jurisdiction that prohibited ABSs and at least one of which was located in a jurisdiction (such as the District of Columbia or England) that allowed ABSs and had owners who were not lawyers.175 The Commission developed a possible proposal that would have amended a Comment to Model Rule 5.4 to say that, as a matter of choice of law principles, such fee sharing should be permissible.176

There was a concerted effort within the House to stop the Commission from the mere study of these two narrow choice of law issues. A group spearheaded by the Illinois State Bar Association sought to pass a resolution—Resolution 10A—that would have reaffirmed the resolution passed in 2000 in response to the MDP Commission’s work, asserting that MDPs are “inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession” and that “[t]he law governing lawyers [in this area] . . . should not be revised.”177 Proponents of Resolution 10A apparently believed that the earlier resolution meant that no rule relating to “nonlawyer ownership” – even rules relating to choice of law principles concerning existing jurisdictional variations in the area – should be revised. The Report accompanying Resolution 10A revealed this objective:

The Commission has indicated that it intends to continue its consideration of the previously recommended amendments to Model Rule 1.5 and 5.4 which if adopted would change the current policy. Because of that intention, it is imperative that the House give its guidance and unambiguous direction as to how the Commission should proceed. A reaffirmation of the existing policy will make it clear that any forthcoming proposal should meet the test of the policy reaffirmed. The proposals that have been offered for consideration have been given great public distribution encouraging the public perception that the profession is interested in allowing nonlawyers to invest in and own law firms. The American Bar Association should wait no longer to make it clear to the public that this is not going to happen. The evils of fee sharing with nonlawyers in jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership can have the same deleterious effect on lawyer independence and control as any other fee sharing with nonlawyers. The American concept and practice of lawyer independence is as important to proclaim and advocate throughout the world as is due process and the rule of law abroad.178

Resolution 10A was postponed indefinitely after a hotly contested debate,179 but the attempt to short-circuit the Commission’s deliberations

174 See id. at 3.
175 See Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 171, at 3.
176 See id. at 6.
177 See ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N & SENIOR LAWYERS DIV., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 163.
178 See id. at 4 (emphasis added).
179 Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA House Postpones Resolution Reaffirming Opposition to Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012),
of the modest choice of law issues related to ABSs nicely illustrates the
opposition to the Commission’s position in this area.\textsuperscript{180}

The Commission ultimately decided to drop both choice of law
proposals – one (the intrafirm fee sharing issue) for reasonable substantive
concerns – so it is not clear how the proposals would have fared in the
House. But this history strongly suggests that efforts to allow ABSs
generated enormous resistance at that time.

Having said all of this, I do agree with critics who say that the
Commission should have at least tried to propose some changes to the
Model Rules in this area. First, there is always a chance that a modest
proposal similar to the discussion draft would have succeeded. Second,
even though the Commission lacked empirical data to show that such a
change would have been beneficial, it could have generated useful new
ideas about structuring law firms in innovative ways without any serious
risks. After all, the discussion draft reflected an approach more restrictive
than the one in place for more than 20 years in the District of Columbia,
where there have been no reports of harm.\textsuperscript{181} Moreover, far more
permissive approaches have emerged abroad, again without any evidence
of harm.\textsuperscript{182} Third, I do not believe that such a proposal would have
jeopardized the Commission’s other proposals, especially if it had been
offered in February 2013 after the Commission’s other work already had
been approved. Indeed, a much more aggressive proposal had not
undermined the work of the Kutak Commission thirty years earlier.
Finally, even if the proposal failed, I believe it would have prompted a
useful discussion about ABSs. But again, it is highly unlikely that the
Commission could have brought about any significant change at that time.

In light of these experiences, I believe that there are two ways to
facilitate reform in this area. First, the ABA can encourage states to
experiment with variations to their versions of Model Rule 5.4. History
reveals that the ABA does not typically initiate controversial changes to

\textsuperscript{180} Notably, the defeat of Resolution 10A did not signal support for the Commission’s
proposed approach to the choice of law problems. A number of people who opposed
Resolution 10A went on the record to say that they were skeptical of any proposal from
the Commission to address the choice of law issues and that they opposed Resolution
10A only on procedural grounds. For more background on Resolution 10A, see Gillers,
\textit{supra} note 31, at 396-403.

\textsuperscript{181} See \textit{Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor to ABA Entities et al., supra
note 130, at 6.}

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, CONSUMER IMPACT REPORT 15 (2014),
firms or unusual levels of complaints in the Legal Ombudsman’s published data”).}
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, the liberalization of the advertising rules, expanded confidentiality disclosure options when clients commit crimes and frauds, and screening for laterally hired lawyers to prevent the imputation of conflicts of interest were incorporated into the Model Rules only after numerous states had made similar changes.\textsuperscript{183} Of course, there is some value in having a nationally uniform body of ethics rules,\textsuperscript{184} but there are strong arguments against a rigid adherence to uniformity.\textsuperscript{185} After all, states regularly adopt variations to the Model Rules.\textsuperscript{186} There is no reason why states should refrain from developing variations to the rules on ABSs. The District of Columbia has experimented in this area without any adverse consequences,\textsuperscript{187} and the State of Washington recently took a step in this direction as well.\textsuperscript{188} Greater state-based experimentation could produce additional information about possible benefits. Taking advantage of the states as the so-called “laboratories of democracy”\textsuperscript{189} would produce invaluable information about how useful ABSs actually are and could lead to changes in the Model Rules in the future.

The second approach is to focus reform efforts on the law of legal services. Once the law in this area is more fully developed, I believe the legal profession’s resistance to ABSs will eventually wane. Lawyers will have less to fear from people who do not have a law license after those people are appropriately regulated and shown to help the public. Moreover, as professionals without a law degree play a more prominent role in the delivery of those services outside of law firms, lawyers will recognize that they have much to lose if the traditional and strict prohibitions on partnering with people who lack a law license continue. Put another way, a loosening of restrictions on ABSs – changes in the law of lawyering – will not by itself drive dramatic changes to the delivery of legal services. Rather, the reverse may be true. Liberalizing and appropriately regulating how people without a law license deliver legal and law-related services (the development of the law of legal services) will ultimately spur changes to the law of lawyering and the delivery of legal services in the United States.

In sum, there is little question that the Commission could not have


\textsuperscript{186} See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., supra note 128 (containing a chapter that documents the numerous variations to each Model Rule).

\textsuperscript{187} See Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor to ABA Entities et al., supra note 130, at 6.

\textsuperscript{188} http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&ruleId=garpc5.09&pdf=1

\textsuperscript{189} New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
achieved bold changes in this area. Although I personally believe the Commission should have proposed at least some modest reform and that there may be ways to facilitate such changes in the future, the Commission faced resistance that was quite consistent with past efforts and revealed that the ABA’s policymaking body was not prepared at that time to liberalize the rules on ABSs.

b. Limited Data the Transformative Potential of ABSs

A less intuitive and more important reason to be skeptical of the “boldness” criticism is that, at the time of the Commission’s deliberations, there was far less evidence supporting the idea that ABSs will produce helpful transformative change than many proponents of ABSs have implied. For example, in a 2014 article in the American Lawyer, Professor Gillian Hadfield was quoted as saying that, “[w]hen the 20/20 Commission concluded there was no compelling need for reform [regarding ABSs], it didn’t research the public interest. . . . The only research it did was to survey lawyers and ask them if they wanted rule changes. That’s not defensible.”

Hadfield’s quote reflects a misunderstanding of the Commission’s process and the actual evidence it sought. The Commission engaged in a significant effort to try to uncover empirical data on this subject, an effort that was ably led by Professor Paul Paton (now the Dean of the University of Alberta School of Law). Paton was the Commission reporter who had primary responsibility for this area, and importantly, he was a proponent of change. He and the Commission’s lead counsel, Ellyn Rosen (now the Deputy Director of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility), searched for empirical or experiential evidence from the U.K., Australia, and the District of Columbia regarding public benefits from ABSs. They found little to none. This is not to suggest that ABSs will not ultimately be helpful, but it is inaccurate to suggest that the Commission did not try to uncover the evidence about how ABSs might affect the public interest.

Significantly, preliminary data from abroad has been released since the Commission finished its work, and it suggests that the effects of change in this area may not be the panacea that proponents of ABS make it out to be. For example, early evidence from the U.K. suggests that alternative business structures (ABS) have not yet had a significant effect on how legal services are delivered there. The U.K. authorized ABSs in

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191 See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2194 (2010) (arguing that the Commission’s discussion of MDP was “essential” to refute the contention that the profession is inherently protectionist).

192 See Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor to ABA Entities et al., supra note 130, at 6-8.
2007 (by statute) and has allowed firms to register as an ABS since 2012. As of January 2015, approximately 350 firms had taken advantage of the opportunity, and there is limited evidence that these entities have appreciably changed the legal services market in the U.K. A 2013 survey reveals that 77% of entities registering as an ABS had not changed how they marketed themselves after becoming an ABS; 91% had not changed their target client base, and 83% had not changed their practice areas. When asked how they differ from firms that are not an ABS, 41% said that they did not differ at all. Only 22% said that being an ABS enabled them to be more competitively priced.

Drawing on this data, Robert Cross, a member of the U.K. Legal Services Board, concluded in June 2014 that “[v]ery little has changed as far as the types of services they provide or whom they provide them to. The answer whether the ABS revolution has driven change would appear to be no.” He believes that recent innovations in the U.K. are not the result of ABS, but rather a product of broader and largely unrelated economic trends, such as technology and globalization. A recent Consumer Impact Report reaches a similar conclusion, asserting that there have been “[m]any examples of innovation following the liberalisation measures, although no single transformative change [has occurred] and MDPs are yet to take off as has been hoped.” Of course, these results are very preliminary and may change considerably over time, especially if ABS licenses are granted more liberally, but there is currently little evidence supporting the conclusion that ABSs are having a transformative effect on the delivery of legal services in the U.K. And to the extent

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193 See supra notes 11, 38-39 and accompanying text.
194 See Register of Licensed Bodies (ABS), SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/firm-based-authorisation/abs-search.page (last visited Feb. 1, 2015); see also LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 182, at 14 (noting that “there has been frustration about the take up of ABS, particularly the small numbers of multi-disciplinary practices”).
195 See LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 182, at 14.
197 See id. at 56.
198 See id.
199 See id. at 58.
200 See LEGAL SERVS. BD., supra note 196, at 58.
202 See id. at 21.
203 See LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 182, at 5.
204 See id. at 10 (explaining that “[t]here have been concerns about the [U.K. Solicitors Regulation Authority’s] licensing process holding back new entrants, particularly multi-disciplinary practices”).
205 See Noel Semple, Access to Justice: Is Legal Services Regulation Blocking the Path, 20 INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 267 (2013); see also LEGAL SERVS. BD., supra note 196,
ABSs are having a significant effect, those effects appear to be disproportionately benefiting business clients, not ordinary consumers.\textsuperscript{206}

The Law Society of Upper Canada recently released a report that raises a similar cautionary note.\textsuperscript{207} It cites the testimony of scholars who conducted an economic analysis of ABS and concluded that “the introduction of the ABS model should facilitate innovation, but would not cause dramatic change to the way in which legal services are provided in Ontario.”\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, the authors of that study explain that “[e]xperience in the UK and Australia suggests that liberalization does invite change, although the pace of change appears to be much more evolutionary than revolutionary, at least to date.”\textsuperscript{209}

A research fellow at Harvard Law School recently reached the same conclusion. He conducted “the most extensive empirical investigation to date on the impact of non-lawyer ownership by focusing on its effects on civil legal services for poor and moderate-income populations.”\textsuperscript{210} He found that, “perhaps counter-intuitively, there is little evidence from the country and case studies to indicate that [ABSs] substantially improved access to civil legal services for poor to moderate-income populations.”\textsuperscript{211} The author posits four possible reasons for this conclusion:

First, persons in need of civil legal services frequently have few resources and so it is unlikely that the market will provide them these services even where non-lawyer ownership is allowed.

Second, many of the legal sectors, like personal injury and social security disability representation, that have seen the greatest investment by non-lawyers will likely not see corresponding increases in access. In these sectors clients are less sensitive to cost considerations since their lawyers are largely paid through conditional or contingency fees or by insurance companies.

Third, non-lawyer investment may not take place in some areas of the legal market because many legal services may not be easy

\textsuperscript{206} See LEGAL SERVS. BD., supra note 196, at 6.
\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 40.
to standardize or scale.

Finally, some persons who could benefit from legal services may be resistant to purchasing them, even if they have ability to do so, either because they do not believe they need a legal service or there are cultural or psychological barriers to accessing the service.212

The idea that ABS does not drive transformative change is consistent with developments in the United States, where there has been considerable innovation throughout the legal industry despite the absence of ABS. These innovations have emerged from startups that offer automated document assembly, expert systems, e-discovery services, legal process outsourcing, online law practice management tools, data analytics, among other services.213 In other words, significant innovations are simply taking place outside of law firms altogether and (as Mr. Cross suggested) are being driven by extant trends, such as rapid advanced in technology and globalization, not ABSs.214

This background suggests that, rather than focusing so fixedly on ABS as the key to unlocking transformative change, it may be more useful to develop regulations that facilitate but appropriately regulate the involvement of more people who do not have a law license in the delivery of legal services. Of course, these two reform options are not mutually exclusive, but if regulatory reform efforts focus on ABS alone, I believe we will overlook reforms that could produce even more useful changes.

In sum, the Commission can hardly be faulted for failing to produce “bold” reforms, because the law of lawyering is ultimately a poor vehicle for transforming the delivery of legal services. Although ABSs are a possible exception, I believe that bold regulatory reform requires us to think outside the law of lawyering box. We need a law of legal services that can liberate but appropriately regulate new players.

IV. TOWARDS THE LAW OF LEGAL SERVICES

To this point, I have argued that the law of lawyering does not offer significant reform options and that a more promising way to promote innovation is through the development of a parallel regulatory framework that permits, but appropriately regulates, greater involvement in the delivery of legal services by people who do not have a law license.215

This new framework is important for two reasons. First, people

212 Id. at 40-41 (internal footnotes omitted).
213 See generally SUSSKIND, supra note 60 (offering an overview of a range of new legal industry providers).
214 See LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 182, at 14 (noting that “it is difficult to separate the impact of the [U.K.’s] competition reforms from other drivers of change such as economic conditions, changes to legal aid availability and litigation funding reforms”).
215 I am not the first person to make the argument for pairing liberalization and regulation in the legal services industry. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, supra note 60; Gillers, supra note 31, at 415 (making a similar suggestion); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 20, at 2607-08.
without a law degree are playing an increasingly valuable and pervasive role in the delivery of legal and law-related services outside of law firms and ABSs.\textsuperscript{216} Examples include automated document assembly services, expert systems, electronic discovery, and legal process outsourcing. Labeling these services as the unauthorized practice of law does not make good policy sense and is in many cases inaccurate, but permitting all of them to operate without any regulatory oversight is also potentially problematic, particularly with regard to consumer facing services. It is thus becoming more important to consider the possibility of regulation where it is needed while ensuring that these new services can flourish and meet marketplace demands. In other words, it is more necessary today than it was just a couple of decades ago to develop a coherent body of law addressing the role that people without a law license play in the legal industry.

Second, states have begun to experiment with the law governing other legal service providers in ways that extend well beyond mere liberalizations of unauthorized practice provisions. For example, Washington State’s LLLTs are not lawyers, but they can deliver some kinds of legal services and advice after obtaining specialized training and licensing.\textsuperscript{217} Additional states are considering similar innovations.\textsuperscript{218}

These developments suggest that we need to think more holistically about the regulation of legal and law-related services and not focus so exclusively on the law of lawyering. That is, we need to develop a system that falls somewhere between the U.K. approach, where people who lack a law license are afforded considerable freedom to operate without any regulatory oversight, and the United States, where such individuals are often forbidden to engage in many kinds of law-related work or challenged if they do.

A. A Flawed Approach: Trying to Define the “Practice of Law”

When developing the law in this area, it is important to avoid the Siren call of defining the “practice of law.” Such efforts typically result in a division of the world into two groups – those who “practice law” and those who do not. Those who practice law are required to be lawyers, and those who do not are largely free of any direct regulation or oversight.

There are at least two problems with this binary approach. First, we do not always need to choose between highly regulated lawyers and completely unregulated “others.” It is possible to have a third group who can deliver legal and law-related services and advice while being subject to appropriate training and licensing. These kinds of innovations are not

\textsuperscript{216} See CBA Futures Report, \textit{supra} note 40, at 19.

\textsuperscript{217} See infra Part IV.D.2.

possible, or at least made more difficult, if the definition of “law practice” is the sole focus of attention.

A second and related problem is the intractability of defining the “practice of law.” Numerous scholars have observed that existing definitions are vague and not much more helpful than the standard for defining obscenity: we know it when we see it.219 Courts have acknowledged the “impossibility” of defining law practice,220 and in 2003, an ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law concluded that it could do no better, effectively giving up on the effort and suggesting that states should come up with their own definitions.221 Moreover, some efforts to define the practice of law could implicate antitrust and related concerns.222

B. A Better Approach: Defining Who Should be Authorized

Rather than trying to define the practice of law, we should ask a fundamentally different question: should someone without a law degree be “authorized” to provide a particular service, even if it might be the “practice of law”? By focusing attention on whether the provider is competent to deliver a service, we can more effectively achieve what really matters: protecting the public.

Consider, for example, the work of accountants. An accountant arguably “practices law” under many plausible definitions of “law practice.” Accountants analyze various features of tax law and make customized recommendations to clients based on their particular circumstances.223 Accountants also produce a wide array of documents for clients that have important legal implications (e.g., tax returns). The reason that accountants are permitted to do their work without a law degree has nothing to do with the definition of “law practice.” Rather,
accountants are permitted to provide their services without a law degree because the public benefits from it. 224 Put another way, accountants are appropriately “authorized” through an extensive licensing regime that ultimately benefits (and protects) the public. 225 Financial planners and other kinds of licensed professionals are similar in this regard. 226

The idea of rejecting a formal definition of the “practice of law” and focusing instead on whether a provider should be authorized to deliver a service (whether or not it is the “practice of law”) is not new. The New Jersey Supreme Court has made the point this way:

[Authorities] consistently reflect the conclusion that the determination of whether someone should be permitted to engage in conduct that is arguably the practice of law is governed not by attempting to apply some definition of what constitutes that practice, but rather by asking whether the public interest is disserved by permitting such conduct. The resolution of the question is determined by practical, not theoretical, considerations; the public interest is weighed by analyzing the competing policies and interests that may be involved in the case. 227

According to this view, we should ask whether the public’s interests will be served by permitting someone without a law degree to provide a particular service (whether or not it is the practice of law) and, if so, determining what kinds of oversight or licensing might be necessary. 228 The challenge, of course, is figuring out what the public’s interests actually are and (as the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests) identifying and “analyzing the competing policies and interests” at stake.

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224 See, e.g., Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 30, at 714.
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 In re Opinion 33 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 733 A.2d 478, 484 (N.J. 1999) (emphases added) (quoting In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1352 (N.J. 1995)).
228 Other professions adopt a similar approach. For instance, in the medical profession, people other than doctors provide a growing range of medical-related services. The growth and state approval of pharmacy clinics staffed by people who are not doctors is one example.
This pyramid reflects one way to think about the question. The bottom of the pyramid captures very routine law-related needs (e.g., the creation of a living will) that can be addressed by completing blank forms. Regulatory barriers should not prohibit people from making these forms available to the public through websites or otherwise. But as consumers’ legal issues become more sophisticated, consumers typically need providers higher up on the pyramid. A central question for the law of legal service is this: at what point must a provider be subject to some kind of regulation?

C. Identifying Principles for the Law of Legal Services

The following is a non-exclusive list of possible policies and interests that may be useful to consider when answering this important question. This list is certainly not the first attempt to define “regulatory objectives.” Bar associations and scholars have tried to do the same, and the list below is informed by those efforts.

229 I am grateful to Paula Littlewood for conceptualizing the issue this way and creating a slightly different version of this pyramid.

To be clear, these considerations do not always point in one direction. In some cases, they suggest that additional oversight or regulation of might be necessary where it is currently absent. In other cases, they suggest that we should permit people who do not have a law license (or technology-enabled tools developed by such people) to deliver more legal and law-related services than is currently allowed, but with appropriate regulatory oversight. By identifying a list of relevant considerations, we can more effectively determine who should be permitted to provide legal and law-related services and the extent to which those who are so permitted should be subject to regulation.

1. Competence

The public has an obvious interest in ensuring that legal and law-related services are competently delivered. The goal is to figure out which services require a formal legal education (i.e., a J.D.), which services could be performed competently with training short of a law degree, and which ones do not need any specialized training at all.

The question here is not whether people without a law degree can perform a service as well as a lawyer, though there is evidence that they can. The focus should be on whether a particular service can be performed competently by someone who does not have a traditional law license, not who can perform the service the best. After all, even when services must be performed by lawyers, we have never concluded that only the most skilled lawyers must handle a matter. The touchstone should be competence.

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231 RHODE, supra note 4, at 15 (explaining that “research concerning nonlawyer specialists in other countries and in American administrative tribunals suggests that these individuals are generally at least as qualified as lawyers to provide assistance on routine matters where legal needs are greatest”); Levin, supra note 8, at 2614; Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 58-59 (2003); Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 30, at 709; Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services, supra note 30, at 214 n.49.

Another reason to avoid comparing the skills of lawyers and “others” is that it is often a false choice. A significant percentage of the public does not have the ability to pay for a lawyer, so even if lawyers might be able to perform some tasks more effectively than someone without a law degree, the choice for many people is between a person who lacks a law license and no help at all. The ultimate question, therefore, should be whether people who do not have licenses are capable of competently providing assistance in a particular area, not whether lawyers are necessarily better.

Undoubtedly, there will be disagreement about who is competent to provide a particular service. Experimentation outside the U.S. (such as in the U.K., where very few services are reserved for lawyers) might provide useful insights, but data is often going to be lacking. Moreover, even if there is general agreement that people are capable of providing a specific service competently without a law license, there may be disagreement about the likelihood that such people actually provide that service competently and whether (and how) the public needs to be protected against the risk of incompetence. There also may be deep disagreement about how certain we need to be that the legal or law-related service can be performed competently by people who do not have a traditional law license. And even when our confidence level is high, we might still disagree about the extent to which regulation or oversight is necessary to provide the sufficient level of comfort.

In the absence of hard data (e.g., from abroad or from U.S. jurisdictions that already experiment in this area, such as Washington State), it is generally fair to say that the more standardized and repeatable the service, the more likely it is that a person without a law degree should be able to perform it competently, perhaps with some training or regulatory oversight. For example, technology-assisted tools, such as automated document assembly tools and expert systems, can reduce the likelihood of errors by making some services (e.g., the incorporation of a business) highly standardized. Other services may be highly standardized because of how routinely they can be performed (e.g., some areas of domestic relations law), even in the absence of technology. The bottom line is that regulators need to consider the likelihood that a person without can competently deliver a particular service by examining available data (if any), the level of training needed to deliver the service, whether any regulation or oversight is necessary to provide the necessary assurance of competence, and the extent to which the process required for delivering the service is highly standardized and easily repeatable.

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2. Free Markets and Consumer Choice (and Some Limits)

When the competence factor cannot be clearly resolved, regulators should generally defer to the market by allowing people to make their own choices. The public has a strong interest in freely choosing service providers and taking into account any number of relevant considerations, such as cost, the provider’s training and experience, and consumer reviews.

On the other hand, markets can fail, and there are at least two ways they could fail in this context. First, the public is not always going to be able to assess the risk of choosing someone who does not have a law license, because many kinds of legal and law-related services are “credence goods” – services whose quality is difficult to measure or assess. For example, the ordinary consumer can have a difficult time assessing whether some kinds of transactional document are well drafted and address a reasonable range of contingencies or existing law. If the public has difficulty assessing how well a service is performed, there is a greater need for regulation (though not necessarily a need to use lawyers; people who are not lawyers could be subject to rigorous licensing and regulation). In contrast, if the quality of the service can be readily determined or if the service is delivered to sophisticated clients (e.g., large companies), these kinds of concerns are less likely to arise.

Another possible problem is that a completely free market could have externalities in certain situations. For instance, if someone who is not a lawyer is permitted to represent people in court without any regulatory oversight or licensing, that person could act in ways that adversely affect third parties or the administration of justice (e.g., asserting frivolous claims).

The point here is that freedom of choice is an important consideration, but regulators also need to consider the extent to which the public can reasonably assess the quality of the services, the extent to which regulations could address any problems with such assessments, the existence of reasonably likely and significant externalities, and whether any regulatory remedies exist to address these possible externalities (e.g., a licensing system that increases the likelihood of quality and provides an administrative remedy for improper conduct).

3. Informed Consumer Choice

Regulators have an interest in ensuring that the public has sufficient and accurate information to make an informed choice about whether to use a particular provider. The needed transparency could take a number of forms. For example, regulators could require people who are not lawyers to prominently disclose their status (i.e., that they are not lawyers and are not a law firm), obtain affirmations from consumers that they understand that the service is not being delivered by a law firm and that a lawyer or

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235 See Hadfield, supra note 9, at 48 (making a similar observation).
law firm might be preferable in certain situations, disclosing the extent to which a lawyer has been involved in the creation or delivery of the service (and the identity and licensing jurisdiction of any such lawyers), and the implications for protections that might otherwise attach (e.g., the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, the duty of confidentiality). Regulators also could require all advertising materials to satisfy the same standard lawyers follow under Model Rule 7.1—i.e., advertising must be truthful and not misleading.  

The particular requirements will necessarily vary depending on the service and type of provider, but if consumers are given a greater range of options for obtaining legal services, it is reasonable to insist that consumers also have access to adequate information to make an informed choice.

4. Accessibility and Availability of Remedies for Incompetence

No matter who performs a legal or law-related service, there is a possibility it will be performed incompetently. In such cases, consumers deserve access to appropriate remedies. For licensed professionals, remedies are readily available through discipline or disbarment. When the provider is not licensed, however, other options may be necessary.

One possibility is litigation. To make this remedy realistic, regulators may need to require some service providers to carry insurance, prohibit them from disclaiming liability (e.g., in a “click through” agreement), or restrict the use of contractual provisions making litigation excessively difficult (e.g., provisions that require arbitration in some distant location or the application of the substantive law of a jurisdiction having nothing to do with the work done). These requirements can help to mitigate some of the concerns about giving the public the freedom to choose non-traditional providers.

One problem is that litigation is not always an available remedy. For example, if someone uses an automated document assembly service to create a will and it turns out to have been negligently created (e.g., it did not reflect important features of state law), the negligence might not be discovered until many years later, perhaps long after the company responsible for the service ceases to exist. Insurance requirements may help to address these kinds of concerns, but the point is that litigation is not a panacea.

The insufficiency of litigation in some contexts does not mean that the public should have to use lawyers. After all, if a lawyer drafts a will incompetently, similar problems can arise. The lawyer or firm responsible for the will may be long gone by the time any negligence is discovered, or the lawyer may not have carried sufficient (or any) malpractice insurance. Only one state—Oregon—requires lawyers to carry malpractice insurance, see

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236 Model Rules of Prof'L Conduct R. 7.1.
237 Only one state—Oregon—requires lawyers to carry malpractice insurance, see
always offer an adequate remedy for incompetence. In these situations, regulators might reasonably conclude that some kind of licensing should be required so that discipline (including the loss of the license) is an available remedy and an additional incentive to ensure competence.

5. Addressing Other Forms of Misconduct

Even if providers of legal services are competent, they may engage in conduct that harms their clients, third parties, or the justice system. For example, if people who are not lawyers are permitted to represent clients in some types of civil cases, we would want to ensure that they follow the same kinds of rules as lawyers, such as rules prohibiting the filing of frivolous claims, making false statements to the court, and communicating with represented people. Lawyers are subject to discipline and court sanctions for violating these rules, and regulators should ensure that, in some contexts, mechanisms exist to sanction any other advocates who engage in similar misconduct. This oversight might require the use of a licensing system that facilitates discipline or the loss of a license in appropriate cases. In other contexts, it might be sufficient to allow for monetary penalties. The point here is that regulators should consider whether mechanisms are needed to prevent or address misconduct that is not remediable through litigation.

6. Faith in the Justice System and the Rule of Law

Democratic societies require a widely shared commitment to the rule of law and faith in the system of justice. In some cases, these goals can

Standing Comm. on Client Protection, Am. Bar Ass’n, State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, A.B.A. 8 (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart_implementation_of_merid.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G9Z7-J349, and a not insignificant percentage of lawyers carry no malpractice coverage, see Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 549-50 (1994) (concluding “[a] significant number of lawyers, especially those struggling to make a living in handling small matters for individual clients, have neither malpractice coverage nor substantial personal assets that could be called upon to satisfy a malpractice judgment”); James M. Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 59, 90-91 (2006) (citing a study suggesting that between 25% and 55% of the bar has no malpractice insurance but contending that the statistics may be overstated); Ron Smith, Task Force Suggests Malpractice Insurance Plan, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 1999, at 3 Journal of the Kansas Bar Ass’n, 68-APR J. Kan. B.A. 3 (1999) (stating that about 35% of Kansas lawyers have no malpractice insurance).

239 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3.
240 See id. R. 4.2.
be more effectively achieved by requiring the use of – and assuring a right to – a lawyer. For example, even if a properly trained person who is not a lawyer could offer the same service as a lawyer in the criminal defense context, the Constitution wisely grants a right to counsel. Without it, a fundamental feature of our system of justice could be legitimately called into question.

It is not possible to address here the much larger debate about the civil Gideon movement, including which legal services should be provided as a matter of right, though the meager government support for legal services is a significant problem that needs to be addressed. The point here is that regulators should consider the importance of a particular service when deciding whether to grant a right to it, and if so, whether a lawyer should be the one to provide it. Moreover, assuming a service is not provided as of right, regulators need to consider the extent to which allowing people who are not lawyers to deliver the service will improve access to that service and enhance faith in social institutions by (for example) making the service more affordable and accessible.

7. Professional Independence and Other Client-Related Protections

Some raise the concern that people who are not lawyers cannot offer clients the same protections as lawyers. For example, people who are not lawyers are not bound by the rules of professional conduct, and communications are not necessarily covered by the attorney-client privilege. It is also argued that, in the absence of a law license, people will not exercise professional independence and will cut corners in order to increase profits at the expense of protecting clients.

8C5B (making a similar observation in the context of articulating regulatory objectives).

242 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

243 Laura I. Appleman, The Community Right to Counsel, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2012) (tracing the history of the right to counsel and concluding that “counsel privileges were at least partially intended to stabilize the social order and reinforce community interests”).


When evaluating these concerns, regulators should consider three points. First, some of these concerns apply equally well to lawyers. For instance, lawyers already have an incentive to prioritize profits over client needs. Lawyers who charge flat fees can make more money if they cut corners.248 Lawyers who charge contingent fees have an incentive to settle a case before spending a substantial amount of money on trial preparation, even if the client might recover more money by going to trial.249 And lawyers who bill by the hour regularly spend more time than is necessary to solve a client’s problems.250 In other words, lawyers are also susceptible to the pressures of increased profits at a client’s expense.

Second, regulators could address many of the disparities between lawyers and other professionals with regard to client protections. For example, it is possible to impose confidentiality obligations on other providers in contexts where they handle particularly sensitive information.251 Similarly, the attorney-client privilege could be extended to include other licensed legal professionals, as has been done in Washington State.252 Or rules could preserve professional independence by prohibiting these other professionals from taking instructions from anyone other than clients.253

Finally, to the extent that lawyers are able to offer clients more protections in certain contexts does not mean that clients should be forced to hire lawyers to solve legal and law-related problems. If someone who is not a lawyer is competent and conflict-free and if clients are made reasonably aware of the risks of selecting that person, the public should be given a choice of providers.

D. Illustrating the Law of Legal Services

To see how the regulatory objectives described above could be used to develop a more robust law of legal services, it is useful to consider two distinct groups of providers: those who are currently offering legal and law-related services and those who could be if they were so authorized.

1. Approaches to Existing Market Actors: Automated Document Assembly as an Example

248 See, e.g., Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 118-119 (2003).
249 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., supra note 29, at 799-800 (summarizing the ways in which a lawyer’s and client’s interests are not necessarily aligned when using contingent fees).
253 See supra note 251, at R. 5.4.
The number of people who are not lawyers and are already involved in the delivery of legal or law-related services is growing rapidly. They provide automated legal document assembly for consumers,\textsuperscript{254} law firms, and corporate counsel;\textsuperscript{255} expert systems that address legal issues through a series of branching questions and answers;\textsuperscript{256} electronic discovery; legal process outsourcing;\textsuperscript{257} legal process insourcing and design;\textsuperscript{258} legal project management and process improvement; knowledge management;\textsuperscript{259} online dispute resolution;\textsuperscript{260} data analytics;\textsuperscript{261} and many other services.\textsuperscript{262} This section explores automated legal document assembly in detail, but the overarching question for all of these new providers is the same: whether they should be subject to regulation or oversight and, if so, what any such regulations should look like.

Some background principles should guide the discussion. First, regulations are more likely to be necessary when a service is offered directly to the public. When a service is purchased or used by lawyers, such as when a lawyer uses an electronic discovery service, indirect regulatory oversight already exists. Lawyers have an ethical responsibility


\textsuperscript{257} These services include a range of legal processes, including some that are closely related to the delivery of legal services, such as legal research and document preparation. This category includes companies that design legal service delivery for corporate legal departments and supply the legal talent to execute the vision under the supervision of in-house counsel. See William Henderson, \textit{Is Axiom the Bellwether for Disruption in the Legal Industry?}, THE LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Nov. 10, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/11/is-axiom-the-bellwether-for-disruption-in-the-legal-industry-look-what-is-happening-in-houston.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F8ZE-4WEP; see also Jennifer Smith, \textit{Companies Curb Use of Outside Law Firms: Staff Attorneys, Which Don’t Bill by the Hour, Are Cheaper, Often More Efficient}, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/articles/companies-curb-use-of-outside-law-firms-1410735625 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).

\textsuperscript{258} Knowledge management enables lawyers to find information efficiently within a lawyer’s own firm, such as by locating a pre-existing document that addresses a legal issue or identifying a lawyer who is already expert in the subject.

\textsuperscript{259} See, e.g., About, MODRIA, http://modria.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4VM4-FMDS (a company that, prior to being spun off from eBay, helped to develop its online consumer dispute resolution system).


to supervise or monitor the “nonlawyer assistance” they use when representing clients.\footnote{See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013).}


A third way is possible and desirable. We can recognize that consumer-facing services are often useful to the public and should be authorized to operate, yet acknowledge that there may be a need for some modest regulation.\footnote{See Gillers, supra note 31, at 415 (making a similar suggestion).} This approach promotes innovation by giving existing providers and potential newcomers greater assurance that they will not be sued by regulators, while ensuring that consumers are adequately protected.

The automated document assembly industry provides a useful test case for this “third way.”\footnote{Despite the recent growth of automated legal document assembly, this market segment is hardly new. Pioneers have been developing these kinds of tools since the 1980s. See, e.g., Marc Lauritsen, Second International Conference on Substantive Technology in the Law School, LAW. PC, no. 6, 1992, at 10. What has changed is that these tools are more powerful and pervasive.} The consumer facing portion of this industry is frequently accused of unauthorized practice, so it has the most to gain if states expressly authorize these kinds of services. At the same time, these services deserve close scrutiny because they sell directly to consumers and do not have lawyers as intermediaries.\footnote{The idea of pursuing a “third way” regulatory approach in this context is not new. For example, Deborah Rhode and Lucy Buford Ricca have argued that, when thinking about innovative companies, "the key focus should not be blocking these innovations from the market, but rather using regulation to ensure that the public’s interests are met." Rhode & Ricca, supra note 20, at 2607-08; see also Gillers, supra note 31, at 415 (making a similar suggestion); Rhode & Ricca, supra note 20, at 2594 (quoting a bar official making the same point).} In the section below, I apply the principles identified in Part IV.C and then propose a possible regulatory model.

### a. Applying the Regulatory Principles
An important initial question for the consumer facing automated document assembly industry is whether it can competently deliver services to consumers. The answer undoubtedly turns on the nature of the service and the sophistication of the provider. For example, Consumer Reports asked experts to assess wills generated by three leading online providers and found that:

[u]sing any of the three services is generally better than drafting the documents yourself without legal training or not having them at all. But unless your needs are simple—say, you want to leave your entire estate to your spouse—none of the will-writing products is likely to entirely meet your needs. And in some cases, the other documents aren’t specific enough or contain language that could lead to ‘an unintended result,’ in [the] words [of one law professor, who was an expert reviewer].

This report suggests a need for some caution, but at the same, it does not imply that we need an outright ban either. After all, more than one million consumers have used LegalZoom alone in just the last ten years, and there is no reliable evidence of incompetence. In fact, the automated nature of the process likely reduces the chance of some kinds of errors.

In sum, there is no reason to think that this industry should be banned, but regulator also should have legitimate concerns about competence and adequate consumer disclosures.

The next consideration is consumer choice. Consumers are overwhelmingly interested in these kinds of services, as evidenced by the sheer number of people who have been willing to pay for them.


270 See LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 268, § 4.45 (making a similar observation).
LegalZoom, which is just one of many players in the industry, filed an S-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2012, when the company was considering an initial public offering. In the year prior to the submission (2011), the company had reported $156 million in revenue. As mentioned above, in its first ten years in business (from 2001 until 2011), LegalZoom had served more than one million customers. Because LegalZoom is just one provider in the industry, these statistics suggest that consumers are increasingly aware of automated document assembly products and want to use them.

Regarding the issue of choice, it is important to remember that consumers are not always choosing automated document providers over lawyers. Because lawyers typically charge higher prices, the choice for many consumers is between an automated document assembly service and no service at all. So even if we assume for the sake of argument that lawyers always deliver higher quality documents than automated document assembly services, many consumers might reasonably decide to select an automated document assembly service, either because they cannot afford a lawyer or because they are willing to sacrifice quality for a lower price. As long as the services are delivered competently, consumers should have the freedom to make this choice.

For similar reasons, new providers are arguably advancing our shared commitment to the rule of law and faith in the system of justice. If more people can afford legal and law-related services because of the existence of consumer facing automated document assembly services, these services ultimately help to preserve the public’s faith that our legal system is available to everyone.

Despite these benefits, there are at least two reasons to consider some regulatory oversight. First, as suggested in Part IV.C, many of the services offered are “credence goods,” so the public is not in the best position to assess the quality of the products offered. Second, some products (e.g., simple wills) have important legal effects, so mistakes and negligence can have significant consequences for consumers and third parties.

Together, these considerations suggest that some consumer protections are worth considering. For example, it might be reasonable to ensure that consumers have legal recourse in the event a service is incompetently performed (e.g., via lawsuits). One possibility is to prohibit providers from asking consumers to waive their rights to a lawsuit or resolve disputes in fora having nothing to do with the service performed. For similar reasons, it would be reasonable to require providers to carry

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272 See LegalZoom Celebrates 10 Years, supra note 269.
273 See supra Part IV.C.2.
274 LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, supra note 268, § 1.5 (making a similar point in the context of wills).
adequate insurance.\textsuperscript{275} Consumers are also entitled to accurate information about the limitations of the services offered. For instance, companies offering automated document assembly services should have to explain the nature of their products (i.e., that they are not offered by a law firm), whether lawyers were involved in preparing the substantive language for the forms or had a role in determining the questions to be asked, the licensing jurisdictions of any such lawyers, and the implications of using the service for protections that might otherwise attach (e.g., the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, the duty confidentiality).\textsuperscript{276} It also might be reasonable to restrict advertising using the same basic standard lawyers must follow under Model Rule 7.1 – i.e., the advertising should be truthful and not misleading.\textsuperscript{277}

\subsection*{b. A Potential Regulatory Approach}

The draft provision below, which could be promulgated either as a court rule or statute,\textsuperscript{278} offers one way to resolve the competing policy considerations at stake.\textsuperscript{279} Section 1 authorizes the delivery of automated legal document assembly tools, and Section 2 imposes some modest requirements on people who offer those services. Although the requirements in Section 2 are arguably more onerous than necessary, they may offer some comfort to those who are skeptical of the benefits of authorizing these providers and thus might provide a politically viable way

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{275} Granted, lawyers in nearly every state (except Oregon) are not subject to the same insurance mandate, \textit{see supra} note 237, but the failure of regulatory authorities to mandate insurance for lawyers is not a justification for failing to impose the obligation in other contexts where it is appropriate.
\item\textsuperscript{276} As explained earlier, regulators might be able to address some of the disparity between the protections afforded to the public when they use lawyers as opposed to other service providers. \textit{See supra} Part IV.C.3. For example, regulators could impose confidentiality obligations on other providers in contexts where they handle particularly sensitive information.
\item\textsuperscript{277} \textit{MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT} R. 7.1 (2013). Another consideration mentioned in Part IV.C is whether providers might cause harm to third parties. To date, there is no evidence of such harms arising from this industry, and there is no reason to expect that automated document assembly services are likely to create these kinds of harms in the future. If this assumption is erroneous, regulators could consider a system of licensure, but in the meantime, such additional oversight seems unnecessary.
\item\textsuperscript{278} This Article does not address the question of who should be responsible for producing these reforms. Possible options include state legislatures, state supreme courts, and even Congress. The ABA could produce model rules or provisions, or the American Law Institute could reframe the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to focus on the Law of Legal Services. The Conference of Chief Justices could take on a similar project. The primary goal of this Article is to provide the framework for reimagining the law in this area, not to identify who should be responsible for creating it.
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to implement the “third way” approach. 280

Definition.

A “Legal Forms Provider” is any person or entity offering law-related forms or documents to the public, including forms or documents generated automatically through guided questions and answers.

Section 1. Legal Forms Providers are authorized to operate in this jurisdiction subject to the limitations in Section 2.

Section 2. If a Legal Forms Provider is not otherwise authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction, is offering forms or documents traditionally offered primarily by lawyers, and is automatically generating the forms or documents through guided questions and answers, 281 the Legal Forms Provider must:

a. Disclose prominently that the Legal Forms Provider is not a lawyer or law firm;

b. Require consumers to affirm their understanding that the service is not being offered by a lawyer or law firm before consumers complete any forms or documents;

c. Disclose prominently whether any lawyers participated in the creation of the forms and, if so, identify the names and licensing jurisdictions of any such lawyers; 282

d. Disclose prominently that the forms are not a substitute for legal advice provided by a lawyer or law firm and that some protections normally afforded to a client’s communications with a lawyer or law firm, such as the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, may not apply;

e. Maintain insurance coverage against errors and omissions in the amount of at least $500,000 per claim and an aggregate coverage of the greater of either $5 million or 5% of annual gross revenue from the sale of forms or documents in the prior calendar year;

f. Allow consumers the right to file a lawsuit against the Legal Forms Provider and not disclaim or limit the Legal Forms Provider’s liability or dictate where any lawsuits against the


281 The purpose of this phrase is to exclude automated document assembly services that are traditionally provided by other kinds of professionals, like accountants (e.g., TurboTax) and financial services professionals. This provision is also intended to exclude from regulation any services offering do-it-yourself blank forms without any substantive guidance.

282 See Gillers, supra note 31, at 417 (making a similar recommendation).
Legal Forms Provider are filed;\textsuperscript{283}  
g. Disclose prominently whether any personally identifiable information provided by the consumer will be made available to a third party and, if so, obtain the consumer’s affirmation that the consumer understands this fact;  
h. Employ advertising and marketing methods that are truthful and not misleading.

Section 3. Any person or entity that violates Section 2 is not authorized to provide the services identified in Section 1 and is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law under [jurisdiction’s unauthorized practice of law statute].

A few of these provisions require some explanation. First, the phrase “traditionally offered primarily by lawyers” is needed to ensure that the regulation does not apply to services that are already adequately regulated. Consider, for example, automated tax document assembly services, like TurboTax. Arguably, that product fits within Section 1, because it helps consumers to create automated law-related documents (i.e., tax forms) through guided questions and answers. There is no public policy reason to subject these kinds of services to the requirements set out in Section 2, because accounting is already subject to a separate regulatory regime. The goal here is to bring within the scope of regulation any law-related document assembly that has historically been reserved primarily for lawyers and where no other regulation currently exists. It is not intended to regulate services that have long been offered by others.

The word “public” in the definition of “Legal Forms Provider” is intended to exclude any services that are sold exclusively to lawyers or corporate counsel. As explained earlier, lawyers have an ethical duty to select competent providers,\textsuperscript{284} so any risks arising from these services are significantly mitigated when lawyers serve as intermediaries. For this reason, Section 2 only applies to services offered directly to the public.

In Section 2, the phrase “automatically generating the forms or documents through guided questions and answers” is intended to make clear that the restrictions do not apply to Legal Forms Providers who offer blank legal forms for consumers to complete. The former services raise more consumer protection concerns because they involve some assessment of the questions that should be asked and imply an understanding of relevant laws or regulations.

The insurance provision is designed to ensure that, if a form is improperly prepared, there is sufficient insurance coverage to compensate people who might have been adversely affected. Because providers are offering the same form to many people simultaneously, providers should have insurance with sufficiently high single occurrence and aggregate limits.

In the end, this approach is designed to encourage potential innovators

\textsuperscript{283} \textit{See id. (making similar recommendation).}

\textsuperscript{284} \textit{See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2013).}
who might otherwise fear accusations of unauthorized practice. Indeed, some of them appear to be in favor of some regulation in exchange for clearer authority to operate. For example, lawyers for LegalZoom recently submitted comments to the ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services and argued that “[w]e need to focus on ‘right’ regulation and not ‘over’ or ‘no’ regulation.” In short, this approach seeks to accomplish a rare feat for new industry regulations: protecting consumers while spurring innovation and growth.

2. Approaches to New Market Actors: Limited License Legal Technicians as an Example

The law of legal services can also create new delivery options. For example, Washington State’s LLLTs have less formal training than lawyers but receive targeted instruction designed to enable them to provide a narrow range of legal and law-related services. In much the same way as healthcare providers other than doctors now deliver some kinds of services at walk-in pharmacy clinics and in numerous other contexts, LLLTs are legal service providers other than lawyers who have the authority to deliver some kinds of legal services and advice outside of a traditional law firm. The question for this group of potential providers is whether they should be given the authority to deliver legal and law-related services at all and, if so, what the appropriate regulation and oversight should look like.

a. Background on the LLLT Program

In 2012, after a dozen years of study and vigorous debate, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a rule authorizing LLLTs as a new category of licensed legal professionals. The rule establishes a LLLT Board, which is responsible for administering the LLLT program and identifying practice areas suitable for LLLTs. In March 2013, the

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286 See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 6, at 616-18.

287 See id. at 613-14 (drawing an analogy to the medical profession).

288 See id. at 612.

289 See id. at 611. Washington State actually has three categories of licensed legal professionals: lawyers, LLLTs, and Limited Practice Officers (LPOs). LPOs are “authorized to select, prepare, and complete documents in a form previously approved by the Limited Practice Board for use in closing a loan, extension of credit, sale, or other transfer of real or personal property.” Limited Practice Officers, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Limited-Licenses/Limited-Practice-Officers (last visited Feb. 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8NGS-CWQF.

290 See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 6, at 616.
Washington Supreme Court unanimously approved the Board’s recommendation to make domestic relations the first LLLT practice area. In particular, LLLTs will be authorized to participate in child support modification actions, dissolution and legal separation actions, domestic violence actions, committed intimate relationship actions, parenting and support actions, parenting plan modifications, paternity actions, and relocation actions.

To obtain the necessary license, LLLTs are required to obtain at least an associate degree from a community college, receive specific practice area education at a law school, pass three exams (a core education exam, a practice area exam, and an ethics exam), and acquire 3,000 hours of substantive law-related experience (e.g., in a lawyer’s office, either before or after passing the examination). The inaugural group of LLLTs is expected to complete this program and become authorized to practice in spring 2015.

The LLLT program has helped to generate new discussion about the possibility of licensing new categories of legal professionals. A recent report by the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education highlighted the development and recommended greater experimentation in this area:

*Broader Delivery of Legal and Related Services:* The delivery of legal and related services today is primarily by J.D.-trained lawyers. However, the services of these highly trained professionals may not be cost-effective for many actual or potential clients, and some communities and constituencies lack realistic access to essential legal services. To expand access to justice, state supreme courts, state bar associations, admitting authorities, and other regulators should devise and consider for adoption new or improved frameworks for licensing or otherwise authorizing providers of legal and related services. This should include authorizing bar admission for people whose preparation may be other than the traditional four-years of college plus three-years of classroom-based law school education, and licensing persons other than holders of a J.D. to deliver limited legal services.

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291 See id.
293 See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 6, at 616-18.
Similarly, the new ABA Commission on the Future of Legal Services has created a Regulatory Opportunities Working Group to study developments in Washington State, and the Working Group is chaired by Washington State Bar Association Executive Director Paula Littlewood and Chief Justice Barbara Madsen of the Washington Supreme Court. Chief Justice Madsen signed the order authorizing LLLTs in Washington State, and Paula Littlewood was instrumental in the program’s adoption and implementation.

Washington State is not the only jurisdiction looking at LLLTs. The California State Bar Board Committee on Regulation, Admission and Discipline Oversight created the California State Bar’s Limited License Working Group, which on June 17, 2013 recommended that California offer limited-practice licenses. The working group recommended that people without a law degree be authorized to provide “discrete, technical, limited scope of law activities in non-complicated legal matters in 1) creditor/debtor law; 2) family law; 3) landlord/tenant law; 4) immigration law.” The recommendation for limited-practice licenses is still in its early stages and will need to work its way through the California State Bar and eventually the California Supreme Court.

b. Application of the Regulatory Principles

The regulatory principles identified in Part IV.C suggest that the LLLT program is well worth considering. With regard to competence, properly trained professionals who do not have a law degree could effectively perform a fair number of legal and law-related services, especially given the level of required training before LLLTs are authorized to deliver services. A useful analogy here is to the medical field, where people who are not doctors deliver a significant percentage of health-related services. Nurses, pharmacists, and medical technicians regularly perform tasks that arguably involve the practice of medicine. Indeed, many states have expanded access to medical services by permitting medical professionals other than doctors to provide routine medical care, such as at “Minute Clinics” in pharmacies. The LLLT

297 See Memorandum from Staff, Limited License Working Grp., Legal Aid Ass’n of Cal. to Members, Limited License Working Grp., Legal Aid Ass’n of Cal. 2 (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.laaonline.org/clientimages/53618/working%20group%20recommendations_june%202013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7WZ7-NE7Y.
298 Id. at 3.
299 See Crossland & Littlewood, supra note 6, at 613-14 (drawing the analogy to the medical profession).
300 Bruce Japsen, CVS Doubles Up Walgreen in Retail Clinics as Obamacare Patients Seek Care, FORBES (June 5, 2014),
model is premised on a similar idea: useful services can be delivered competently in a limited scope by professionals with less extensive training than those who have traditional licenses.

The LLLT program ensures competence by limiting the work that LLLTs can perform. Before a new area of practice is permitted, the LLLT Board must conclude that LLLTs can deliver the services competently, and the Washington Supreme Court must agree. Moreover, the LLLTs must take subject matter specific coursework before obtaining a LLLTs license, and they must pass a special exam for each practice area in which they want to be licensed. These restrictions and requirements provide a high level of confidence that LLLTs will be competent in their designated areas of specialty.

In many ways, the LLLT training and licensing process is arguably a greater guarantee of competence than the training most law students receive. After all, lawyers are permitted to practice in any area once they obtain a license, even if they have never had any formal training in the subject. In contrast, LLLTs are permitted to deliver services only in the very specific areas where they have had training. Put another way, there is no more reason to be concerned about the competence of LLLTs who practice in a narrow area than the competence of lawyers who only receive very general training and are permitted to practice in nearly any area of their choosing.

Another way to think about the competence issue is that the LLLT program helps to reduce the number of unauthorized providers. As the Washington Supreme Court observed, “[t]here are far too many unlicensed, unregulated and unscrupulous "practitioners" preying on those who need legal help but cannot afford an attorney. Establishing a rule for the application, regulation, oversight and discipline of non-attorney practitioners establishes a regulatory framework that reduces the risk that members of the public will fall victim to those who are currently filling the gap in affordable legal services.”

The facilitation of consumer choice also favors the LLLTs program. Just as consumers have benefited from having the option of visiting pharmacies to obtain routine medical care, consumers will benefit from having the option of choosing a LLLT to provide some kind of legal services. If a LLLT can perform a legal service competently and at a lower cost than a lawyer, consumer should have the right to select a LLLT.

At the same time, the transparency principle is important in this


304 See Order, supra note 301, at 10.
context to ensure that consumers who use LLLTs are fully aware that LLLTs are not lawyers, that a LLLT’s services are necessarily limited, and that a LLLT has training that differs in kind relative to lawyers. For this reason, Washington State currently prohibits LLLTs from advertising in such a way that “could cause a client to believe that the [LLLT] possesses professional legal skills beyond those authorized by the license held by the [LLLT].”

The regulatory principle of ensuring adequate consumer remedies is also easy to satisfy. Because LLLTs are licensed and subject to their own rules of professional conduct, they will be subject to discipline or license revocation if they engage in inappropriate conduct. LLLTs also can be required to carry insurance; indeed, an insurance market has emerged in Washington State to serve the emerging LLLT category.

Finally, the LLLT option also fosters faith in the justice system and the rule of law by expanding the options that people have to access needed legal and law-related services.

In the end, the LLLT program serves the public interest and advances the regulatory objectives that should form the core of the law of legal services. The Washington Supreme Court made the point nicely in its order creating the LLLT program:

[T]he basis of any regulatory scheme, including our exercise of the exclusive authority to determine who can practice law in this state and under what circumstances, must start and end with the public interest; and any regulatory scheme must be designed to ensure that those who provide legal and law related services have the education, knowledge, skills and abilities to do so. Protecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any practice area is not a legitimate objective.

As the Washington Supreme Court itself conceded, the LLLT program is a relatively modest reform and will not “solve the access to justice crisis for moderate income individuals with legal needs.” It nevertheless provides a useful starting place for thinking about how the law of legal services could bring about changes that are qualitatively different from, and potentially more dramatic than, reforms relying solely on the law of lawyering.

V. Conclusion

The law of lawyering is undoubtedly important, but it offers few options for transforming the delivery of legal services. ABS is one possible exception, but even that reform envisions a world where lawyers
remain the exclusive deliverers of legal advice. The law of legal services reflects a different approach to regulatory innovation, one that seeks to authorize, but appropriately regulate, the delivery of legal and law-related assistance by more people who lack a traditional law license. At a time when legal services are increasingly unaffordable, the law of legal services may reflect a promising way to unlock innovation and reimage the regulation of the twenty-first century legal marketplace.